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This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under
complete information when the strategic and informational details of the par-
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tation concept which is shown to be related to ‘strong Nash’ implementation
in the corresponding simultaneous participation game.
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1 Introduction
‘A particular modeling difficulty of noncooperative game theory is the sensitivity
of Nash equilibrium to the rules of the game, e.g., the order of players’ moves and
the information structure. Since such details are often not available to the modeler
or even to the players of the game, equilibrium prediction may be unreliable.’ (Kalai
[22], pp 1632). Economic theory usually considers specific games and studies their
equilibrium sets. In this way and by means of the revelation principle, the mech-
anism design paradigm considers direct mechanisms where agents are taking their
participation decisions simultaneously. Such an approach implicitly assumes that
the principal controls the details of the rules of the underlying proposed game. At
first glance, it seems reasonable: all potential participants are invited in separated
rooms where they privately report their messages that are then jointly opened by the
principal under the scrutiny of a judge. However, participation decisions have a dif-
ferent nature than the report of private signals: it corresponds to the action whether
or not to enter the room under our metaphor of the mechanism design paradigm,
an action which can e.g. be visible to the other agents before they are taking their
own participation decision. A second support for our approach is that even if the
potential participants are effectively locked in a room it is often the case that those
agents are not corresponding to the real decision-makers from which they take formal
instructions. The real participation game would correspond to the one between the
decision-makers and which is then out of control from the principal’s perspective.
The non-simultaneous nature of the participation decisions is especially relevant if
the instructions are resulting from some collegial decisions where the different colleges
can keep a close watch on each other. In the same vein as Kalai [22, 23], we consider
here that the principal has no idea on the participation game which is played, which
will bring us to consider implementation concepts requiring that full participation is
an equilibrium not only of the (traditional) simultaneous-move participation game
but also for a very large class of extensive games, capturing the lack of knowledge of
the principal on the details of how the participation game is played. In other words,
full participation is required to be an equilibrium for partially-specified participation
games (henceforth PG).1
1Relaxing the common knowledge assumptions on the trading game may seem at odd with the
original formulation of the ‘Wilson Doctrine’. However in environments where enforcement on the
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The reliability of an equilibrium prediction is usually captured by equilibrium re-
finements while still assuming simultaneous-move. Rationalizability (Tan and Wer-
lang [42]), dominant strategy (Chung and Ely [10]) and ex-post equilibrium (Berge-
mann and Morris [4]) are examples of detail-free implementation criteria in this
research program whose agenda is to relax the common knowledge assumptions on
agents’ beliefs about another’s preferences and information, a program which is also
known as the ‘Wilson Doctrine’ (Wilson [44]). Another kind of equilibrium refine-
ments aims to capture the possibility of cooperation among agents. The most popular
ones are coalition-proof equilibrium (Bernheim et al [5]) and STRONG Nash equi-
librium (Aumann [3]). This latter concept which is the narrowest requires that no
coalition of agents could jointly deviate in a way that benefits all of its members.
Coalitions are allowed to use correlated strategies on the contrary to the related
concept where coalition are restricted to use pure strategies and which is called here
‘strong Nash’ equilibrium.2 Alternative coalitional concepts are putting some re-
striction on the set of feasible deviations, e.g. they are themselves also immune
to deviations from some of its members, in particular individual deviations. Those
refinements are justified as having an ‘intuitive’ appeal, e.g. coalition-proof equi-
libria are supposed to reflect that agents can freely discuss while being unable to
make binding commitments. Nevertheless, the non-cooperative foundation for such
cooperative equilibrium concepts remains unclear.3
In the mechanism design framework with complete information, the present paper
makes two contributions.4
In a first step, we characterize in Theorem 1 the optimal revenue that can be
details of the participation process seems difficult, we do think that we are remaining in line with
the spirit if not the letter of the ‘Wilson doctrine’. However, we do not claim that, in general,
principals have no control with regards to participation processes. The differences in the online
versions of the ascending auction used at Amazon and eBay and analyzed by Ockenfels and Roth
[32] is a good example of how small details on the trading rules can have a first-order impact on
participation decisions.
2The use of lowercase letters reflects the point that the equilibrium constraints under ‘strong
Nash’ are weaker than under STRONG Nash.
3More recently, Ambrus [1] proposes a new (and somehow weaker) solution concept, coalitional
rationalizability, that addresses the issue of coalitional agreements. In Ambrus [2], an epistemic
foundation is given for this solution concept and some variations.
4We consider that the principal is fully informed. It should not be confused with ‘implemen-
tation theory’ that considers that there is not asymmetric information between agents and that
the principal is uninformed. See Dutta and Sen [14] for a characterization of implementable social
choice functions under strong Nash equilibrium. In such an environment and with transferable
utilities, Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [34] exhibit a simple budget-balanced bidding mechanism
that implements the efficient allocation under strong Nash equilibrium.
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raised under extensively (subgame-perfect) robust implementation criteria and show
that it corresponds to the optimal revenue raised under the strong Nash implemen-
tation criterium in the simultaneous-move PG. The Coasian logic still applies and we
obtain that the optimal mechanism is efficient. Nevertheless, full extraction relative
to the harsher threats as in Jehiel et al [20] does not work anymore, in general, in
presence of negative externalities. Furthermore, Theorem 1 characterizes the struc-
ture of the rents left to the different agents in those extensively robust or strong
Nash implementable optimal mechanisms. The proof is in three steps. First we
show any extensively robust implementable mechanism is necessary strong Nash im-
plementable. Additional to the usual individual rationality constraints, it requires
that there is no set of agents S ⊂ N such that all agents in S prefer the outcome
where only the agents in N \ S participate to the outcome where all agents accept
the mechanism. Second we characterize in Proposition 4.4 the optimal design under
the strong Nash constraints. Those ‘coalitional constraints’ in the mechanism design
program are non-linear and the set of implementable mechanisms is thus in general
not convex. Nevertheless, the optimal design program can be greatly simplified: we
separate in Proposition 4.4 the choice of the final allocation to the structure of the
optimal threats. The latter has a divide and conquer flavor: it consists in giving the
incentive to participate for one agent, say 1, independently of the participation deci-
sions of the other agents. Then given that agent 1 will surely participate, the principal
can really threat another agent, say 2, to use agent 1 in case of non-participation
in order to minimize his payoff. Then she threats the next agent conditionally on
the participation of agents 1 and 2 and so on. The optimal design consists thus
in finding the optimal ‘order’ to define those threats, which corresponds to a per-
mutation among the agents. Third we show by means of carefully specified out of
equilibrium transfers that the strong Nash implementable optimal designs can be
made extensively robust implementable.
Despite the huge similarity with Kalai’s framework, we emphasize important
differences. First, our analysis deals with robustness concepts that incorporate
subgame-perfection. Second, our analysis does not consider the convergence to equi-
librium concepts when the number of players grows to infinity but exact equilibria
for any number of players. Those two assumptions are crucial in Kalai’s analysis and
we can wonder whether much can be said with robustness criteria such that the equi-
4
libria of most standard familiar games fail to pass the test, not only in the ‘Matching
Pennies’, ‘Battle of the sex’ or ‘Chicken’ games but also in the ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’
that is dominant-strategy solvable. However, in a mechanism design framework, the
principal has a lot of flexibility on the final payoffs especially through the mone-
tary transfers such that the existence issue is circumvented.5 In a given mechanism,
checking that full participation is a subgame perfect equilibrium for all extensive
versions à la Kalai seems to be an untractable task in general, though we make an
important step by providing general necessary and sufficient conditions in Proposi-
tion 4.3 and 4.6 in the first and third step of the proof of Theorem 1. Furthermore,
simple examples illustrate that such a robustness criterium may be too strong. It
brings us to consider a restricted class of the extensive PGs à la Kalai that will allow
us to characterize the set of implementable mechanisms in a tractable way though
not modifying the rents in the optimal designs.
In a second step, we consider a slightly different set of extensive games by adding
two additional ingredients: first, after an agent is irreversibly committed to partic-
ipating in the mechanism, all the remaining agents have the opportunity to partic-
ipate. Second, such an irreversible commitment is always publicly observable. The
extension of the participation deadline after a bid submission at Amazon modeled as
in Ockenfels and Roth [32] is a good example of such extensive games with subsequent
opportunities and perfect information. On the contrary, the simultaneous-move PG
does not belong to this subclass. We emphasize that this subclass still allows for wide
flexibility in the order of players’ moves as well as for informational leakage, commit-
ment and revision possibilities, cheap talk, and more. Theorem 2 establishes that
extensive robustness implementation in this subclass is equivalent to strong Nash
implementation. Not only do we provide a tractable way to check whether full par-
ticipation in a given mechanism remains a (and actually the unique) subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcome in a large class of extensive versions of the simultaneous-move
game, but we also give a non-cooperative foundation of strong Nash implementation
in this framework. This equivalence is extended in Theorem 3 where subgame per-
fection is relaxed to p-subgame perfection with Nash best-responses being required
only on histories with a limited depth with regards to the number of players’ that
5To obtain that all equilibria of simultaneous-move games become asymptotically extensively
robust, Kalai [22] needs an assumption on the final payoffs: players are assumed to be semi-
anonymous.
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deviate and where strong Nash equilibrium constraints are relaxed to p-strong Nash
with ‘coalitional constraints’ being required only for coalition of limited size.
A by-product of our analysis on partially-specified PGs is thus a contribution to
the Nash program which aims to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and
cooperative approaches to game theory. The bulk of the works in this area - recently
surveyed by Serrano [40]- are devoted to the construction of families of bidding or
bargaining games whose equilibria are corresponding to cooperative solution concepts
as the Shapley value or the Core.6 To the best of our knowledge, the Nash program is
silent on the cooperative concepts that are often used in non-cooperative approaches
as ‘intuitive’ equilibrium refinements: by relaxing the commitment ability of the
principal in the way she controls the PG, we give some theoretical foundations for
the use of the strong Nash implementation criteria in the standard mechanism design
approach.
Our insights are linked to two main topics in mechanism design: imperfect com-
mitment and the possibility of full surplus extraction. First, relaxing the commit-
ment power of the principal with regards to the rules of the game is precisely the
focus of a still growing literature about mechanism design or positive design with
imperfect commitment.7 In corporate acquisitions and procurement auctions, it is
common that the seller violates the announced rules to provide opportunities for
bid readjustments (see Compte et al. [11] and McAdams and Schwarz [28]). In
electronic auctions and in auction houses, it is common that the seller uses a shill
bidder to participate in the mechanism as any other participants (see Lamy [26, 27]).
Second, in an incomplete information setup with strictly correlated signals, Crémer
and McLean [13] show that the principal can implement the efficient allocation while
leaving no informational rents to the agents as in a complete information setup,
where full extraction can be reached even in dominant strategies as shown by Jehiel
6See Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [33] for generalized multi-bidding games and Moldovanu and
Winter [31] and Hart and Mas-Collel [17] for alternating-offers bargaining games. It is worthwhile
to note that by considering order independent equilibria, that is strategy profiles that remain an
equilibrium and lead to the same payoff independently of the specification of the order of the moves,
Moldovanu and Winter [31] can now be viewed as a pioneering contribution in the research program
on game theory with partially-specified games though their analysis still imposes a lot of structure
on the family of bargaining games they consider. See also Caruana and Einav [7] for ‘grid invariant
equilibria’ and other protocol-free related properties.
7Closely related is the literature on commitment failures with regards to future interactions. See
Tirole [43] for a survey and Skreta [41] and Zheng [46] for recent contributions in an auction setup,
respectively with the impossibility to commit not to re-auction the good or to ban future resale
between bidders.
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et al. [20]. Heifetz and Neeman [18] show that generic priors on the universal type
space do not allow for full surplus extraction in an incomplete information setup.
Their insight is that, generically, private information implies informational rents.
With a common concern for robustness, this paper show that the principal may
not be able to fully extract agents’ surplus relative to their harsher threats in a
complete information setup if the implementation criterium is strengthened. Partial
extraction comes from what can be called coalitional rents : the ‘coalitional partici-
pation constraints’, either explicit through the strong Nash equilibrium refinements
or implicit through the robustness to any extensive PGs are a new channel for im-
perfect surplus extraction in addition to the well-known ‘incentive constraints’ that
create informational rents. Coalitional rents are shown to be driven by negative
allocative externalities: the possibility for some agents to hurt their peers by their
mere participation.
The paper is organized as follows. Our basic insights are illustrated by means
of a simple example in section 2. In section 3 we introduce the general allocation
problem and our implementation criteria. The proper foundation of our restriction
to the analysis of direct mechanisms without reports and to the implementation of
the full participation outcome is relegated to section 6. The optimal mechanisms un-
der extensively subgame-perfect robust implementation are characterized in section 4
where the optimal mechanisms under strong Nash implementation are also character-
ized as a key step in the proof. In section 5, PGs with subsequent opportunities and
perfect information are considered and extensively robust implementation is shown
to be equivalent to strong Nash implementation. Section 7 extends the analysis with
partial perfection equilibrium criteria. Additional comments are gathered in section
8, including additional motivations and applications for our analysis.
2 A Simple Example 8
Consider the sale of a single object involving identity-dependent externalities
among two potential competitors. Bidders 1 and 2 are valuing intrinsically (with
regards to the statu quo with no sale) the good V which is assumed to be greater
than v the reservation price of the seller. However if he does not obtain the object
8A reader eager to get our results may skip this subsection at first reading.
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Table 1: ‘Prisoner’s dilemma’
NP P
NP (0,0) (−α,V − v)
P (V − v,−α) (−α,−α)
bidder i (i = 1, 2) suffers from a negative allocative externality α when the object is
allocated to his opponent j. The allocative externality is supposed to be important
enough such that the efficient allocation consists in keeping the object, i.e. α > V −v.
We consider that the seller is able to allocate the object only to participating agents.
In other words, she can not dump the object to a non-participant.9
Standard Auctions The buyers have first the opportunity to decide whether or
not they want to participate in the auction. Then participation decisions are publicly
revealed before a first price auction takes place. The final payoffs as a function of
their participation decisions are summarized in Table 1 where NP and P respectively
correspond to the nonparticipation and participation decisions.10
If the participation decisions are modeled as resulting from a simultaneous-move
PG as in Jehiel and Moldovanu [19], it is an equilibrium outcome that agents 1 and
2 both participate and are then submitting the bid V + α in the subsequent auc-
tion. They are both suffering from a loss of α compared to their profits in the case
where they could jointly coordinate themselves not to participate. Now consider a
sequential PG between agents 1 and 2 as depicted in the left upper panel of Figure 2.
The final payoffs are determined by the set of participants depicted in the brackets
at the final nodes of the extensive version. The game corresponds to the sequential
game where agent 2 makes his participation decision after being fully informed of the
choice of agent 1, but with the slight modification that if agent 2 agrees to participate
to the mechanism (action ‘YES’) after agent 1 initially chooses the action ‘NO’ then
agent 1 can reconsider his participation decision. The full participation outcome is
not a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome in this extensive version. When agent 2
9The reservation price can equivalently be viewed as a reduced form for a third potential bid-
der with a pure private valuation v. This example formalizes the motivating story in Jehiel and
Moldovanu [19] where two potential buyers suffering from important reciprocal negative externali-
ties prefer not to participate in the bidding process and let a third buyer win at a low price.
10The final payoffs are unchanged for most other standard auction formats as the second price
auction or the English button auction.
8
considers whether to participate, he knows that it is then irreversible and will induce
the participation of his opponent in the case he is still not committed to participat-
ing. Consequently, when making a participation decision, he compares the outcome
where they both participate to the outcome where they both do not participate. The
sequential PG offers implicitly a kind of coalitional agreement that makes the non-
participation decisions the unique equilibrium outcome. We thus obtain a paradox
that cannot emerge in previous models with simultaneous participation: an agent
may prefer not to submit a bid though his intrinsic value for the good, i.e. excluding
the motivations to outbid resulting from the fear of negative externalities, is greater
than the final bid.11
The final payoffs of the PG are corresponding to a kind of ‘Prisoner’s dilemma’
where nonparticipation/participation corresponds to the cooperate/deviate actions.
It differs however from the standard version where cooperation is a strictly domi-
nated strategy and where the full deviation outcome is the unique rationalizable final
outcome. However all the above analysis would remain valid: it illustrates the point
that participation being a dominant strategy for any player in the simultaneous-move
version does not guarantee that full participation is the equilibrium outcome in all
extensive versions.
The Optimal Mechanism Under the simultaneous-move PG and complete in-
formation, Jehiel et al. [20] presents an optimal mechanism where participation
is a dominant strategy. The optimal mechanism is always efficient and the seller
can extract surplus from agents who do not obtain the object by using the optimal
threats, i.e. giving the object to the most feared opponent in case of nonparticipa-
tion. Here the optimal mechanism raises the revenue 2α: each bidder has to pay α
in order to avoid that the seller gives the object to his most feared opponent and
the seller keeps the object. However, for some PG that are corresponding to ‘natu-
ral’ alteration of the simultaneous-move game, agents 1 and 2 can coordinate their
participation decisions by jointly not participating which is Pareto improving. More
generally, the seller can never keep the object while extracting a strictly positive
surplus (with respect to the harsher threats) from both agents 1 and 2. Otherwise,
11In Jehiel and Moldovanu [19], V is assumed to be smaller than v such that the final payoff
outcome when only one of the bidders 1 and 2 participate is (0, 0). On the contrary, nonparticipation
from either agent 1 or 2 does not help here and cannot prevent the purchase by his ‘feared opponent’
in the auction. Strategic nonparticipation has thus here a completely different nature.
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they could jointly not participate and obtain a null payoff since the seller is assumed
to be unable to ‘dump’ the object. In other words, some ‘coalitional participation
constraints’ would be violated. To maximize her revenue, the seller should use a
divide and conquer strategy: it consists in giving the incentive to participate for one
agent, say 1, independently of the participation decision of agent 2. Then given that
agent 1 participates, she could really threat agent 2 to allocate the object to agent 1
in case of non-participation. We will show that it is actually the optimal extensively
robust mechanism and it raises the revenue α.
Additionally to our central insight that the optimal design depends critically on
to the way PGs are modeled, the example illustrates several features that are gen-
eralized in section 4 when the mechanism is required to be robust for any extensive
version of the simultaneous-move PG. First the optimal design implements the effi-
cient outcome. Second those additional constraints may reduce strictly the revenue
in presence of negative allocative externalities. Finally, we find surprisingly that
although agents 1 and 2 are symmetric, they should not be treated in a symmet-
ric way in an optimal mechanism. That is the reason why standard auctions that




Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of agents and A = {a1, a2, . . . , aK} be a finite set of
possible outcomes. Denote by Σ(N) the set of the permutations over the set N . For a
given permutation σ : N → N , denote by T σi the subset {σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(i−1)}, i.e.
the i−1 first smallest agents according to the implicit order defined by σ. Denote by
]S the cardinality of the set S ⊂ N . We assume that the agents and the principal,
characterized by the subscript 0, have quasilinear preferences over outcomes and
(divisible) money. Preferences are assumed to be common knowledge. The utility
of a player i over outcome a ∈ A and the money transfer ti (to the principal) is:
Ui(a, ti) = V ai − ti.
The principal announces a direct mechanism, denoted by (a, t), that specifies a
final outcome a(S) and a vector of monetary transfers t(S) for each possible set of
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participants S ⊂ N . Monetary transfers are assumed to be deterministic w.l.o.g.
since players are assumed to be risk-neutral. A mechanism is said to be feasible if:
• For each set of participants S, the final outcome belongs to the set of probability
distributions on A(S), the subset of A of accessible or feasible outcome with
the consent of agents in S.
• If agent i decides not to participate, the principal cannot extract a positive
payment from that agent: ti(S) ≤ 0, for all i ∈ N \ S.
• Transfers are budget-balanced: ∑ni=0 ti(S) = 0, for any S ⊂ N .
The second and third restrictions are standard. The first restriction means that
some outcomes in A may not be feasible if some agents refuse to participate. For
example, in the case of the sale of an indivisible good, Jehiel et al. [20] considers
that one cannot ‘dump’ the object on a non-participating agent. In the case of
exclusionary contracts, Segal and Whinston [38] consider that an incumbent can
deter entry only if the number of ‘captured’ agent is above a given threshold. We do
not impose any specific structure on the feasibility sets {A(S)}S⊂N except that:
Assumption 1 A(S) ⊂ A(T ), whenever S ⊂ T .
Assumption 1 states that if the consent of the agents in S is enough to implement
a given final outcome a, then the extra consent of some agents outside S cannot
make this outcome unfeasible. Then, there is no loss of generality to consider that
A(N) = A. We call an efficient allocation any allocation a ∈ A that maximizes∑n
i=0 V
a
i . For an agent i and a set of participants S ⊂ N \ {i}, denote by a∗i (S)
the harsher feasible threat that the principal can inflict on i given that the agents
in S have accepted the mechanism: a∗i (S) ∈ Argmina∈A(S) V ai . Denote by V ∗i (S) =
V
a∗i (S)
i the corresponding utility level. On the one hand, only the threats a∗i (N \
{i}) do matter in mechanism design under simultaneous-move participation. In the
optimal design, if one agent refuses the mechanism, the remaining ones commit to
this harsher threat also called ‘minmax punishment’ as in Caillaud and Jehiel [6]
or Jehiel et al. [20]. On the other hand, in extensively robust implementation, the
whole set of the feasible threats a∗i (S) will play an active role in the computation of
the optimal mechanism. On the whole, our framework is characterized by the 4-uple:
(N,A, {V ai }i∈N,a∈A, {A(S)}S⊂N).
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Let us define two special subsets among those frameworks: externality-free and
negative-externality-free frameworks.
Definition 1 • A framework is said to be externality-free if for any agent i, the
map a→ V ai is constant over the set A(N \ {i}).
• A framework is said to be negative-externality-free if the optimal threat V ∗i (S)
for any agent i is independent of the set of participant S ⊂ N \ {i}: V ∗i (S) =
V ∗i (∅) for any i ∈ N and S ⊂ N \ {i}.
A framework is said to be externality-free if the agents do not care about the final
outcome in the event where they do not participate in the mechanism. For the sale
of some goods and under the assumption that a non-participant does not receive any
good, it corresponds to the standard case where agents care only on the set of goods
they obtain and in particular are indifferent to the final allocation when they are
non-purchaser. Negative-externality-free is less restrictive: it only requires that the
principal can credibly threat any agent with the minmax punishment independently
of the other participants, i.e. by retaining all goods in the above example. Appli-
cations where externalities are negative are the general category of interest where
the optimal design may be modified by our alternative implementation concepts.
Genicot and Ray [15] and Segal [36] discuss extensively related applications that go
beyond network externalities in industrial organization.
3.2 Implementation criteria
We first consider implementation concepts under the simultaneous-move PG. In
the following, mechanisms are simply labeled as ‘implementable’, ‘strong-Nash im-
plementable’ or ‘STRONG-Nash implementable’ when full participation satisfies the
corresponding equilibrium property in the simultaneous-move PG in contrast to the
‘extensively robust implementable’ terminology which will refer to as full participa-
tion being an equilibrium outcome in every extensive version, metagame or alteration
of the simultaneous-move PG according to Ehud Kalai’s various terminologies of the
same idea that the PG is partially-specified.
Definition 2 Full participation is respectively an equilibrium, a strong-Nash equilib-





i − ti(N)− V a(N\{i})i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N, (1)
max
i∈N\S
{V a(N)i − ti(N)− V a(S)i } ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ N, (2)
and max
i∈N\S





i − ti(S ′)]× µS(S ′)} ≥ 0 (3)
for any S ⊂ N and any probability distribution µS(.) on ∆(S) = {S ′|S ′ ⊃ S} such
that µS(S ′) denotes the probability that the set of participants is S ′.
The constraints in (1) corresponds to the usual Individual Rationality or Partic-
ipation constraints in mechanism design. The strong-Nash equilibrium concept puts
additional restriction by explicitly adding some ‘coalitional participation constraints’
(2): for each subset of players S ⊂ N , there is no joint deviations in pure strategies
that is profitable for all of its members. In other words there is no set of participants
such that all of its members would benefit if they jointly refuse to participate. This
concept is indeed slightly weaker than the original concept introduced by Aumann
[3] where the immunity to all joint deviations in possible correlated mixed strategies
-constraints (3)- is considered and which is labeled as STRONG-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3 (simultaneous-move implementation) A mechanism (a, t) is im-
plementable, respectively strong Nash [STRONG Nash] implementable if it is feasible
and if full participation is an equilibrium, respectively a strong Nash [STRONG Nash]
equilibrium, of the simultaneous participation game.
Any strong Nash implementable mechanism is necessary implementable as ‘coali-
tional constraints’ are including the usual individual rationality constraints. The
converse does not hold in general as it has been illustrated by the PG in section 2
which corresponds to a prisoner’s dilemma. However, in externality-free frameworks
it does: the individual rationality constraints (1) imply the strong Nash constraints
2. The payoff tables in Figure 1, with the action NP and P respectively corre-
sponding to nonparticipation and participation, provides additional examples our
various simultaneous-move implementation concepts. The ‘Battle of the sex’ and
‘Pure Coordination game’ are STRONG Nash implementable. In the game in the
left lower panel, full participation is a strong Nash equilibria. Moverover, participa-


















Figure 1: Payoff Tables: NP/P for NonParticipation/Participation
the agents would profitably deviate with the correlated strategy profile alternating
between (NP,P ) and (P,NP ) with probability one-half and obtain the expected
payoff (3, 3) > (2, 2).
Starting from a mechanism (a, t), we first describe a large number of variations
on how the game may be played. We closely follow Kalai [23] formalization.
Definition 4 A participation game (PG) of (a, t) is any finite extensive game B
(with perfect recall) with the following properties:
1. B includes the (original) players: The players of B constitute a superset of N .
2. Playing B means playing (a, t): With every final node of B, (a, t), there is an
associated unique profile of participants S such that (a, t) = (a(S), t(S)).
3. Unaltered payoffs: The payoffs of any player i ∈ N at every final node (a, t)
are the same as their payoffs in the original mechanism, i.e. Ui(a, ti).
4. Preservation of the original strategies: for any player i ∈ N , every pure strategy
has at least one B-adaptation. That is, a B-strategy that guarantees ending at a
final node corresponding to a final set of participants S ⊃ {i} and a B-strategy
that guarantees ending at a final node with {i} /∈ S (no matter what strategies
are used by the opponents).
External players are allowed to participate in such variations as in Kalai [23]. In
particular the principal herself may be possibly a player of the PG. Our results do
not depend on such an assumption, e.g. the optimal design remains unchanged if
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the principal is able to commit not to participate in the PG. In the following we
will use PG with a unique external player that is labeled as ‘nature’. See Kalai
[22] for a panel examples with rounds of revisions, changes in the order of play or
nature selecting some moves, illustrating how rich is the set of PGs. Figure 2 depicts
other possibilities with two agents. Version 1 has been discussed in section 2 to
illustrate how the equilibrium in the simultaneous-move prisoner’s dilemma may not
be robust in extensive versions. Version 2 is a mirror version of the extensive version
1 by permuting the role of the action YES and NO which are corresponding to some





























Figure 2: Participation games
The bottom panel of Figure 2 depicts a third extensive version of a PG with two
agents. The game is a modification of the sequential game where agent 1 makes
his participation decision after being fully informed of the choice of agent 2. At
the first stage, agent 2 has an additional action (‘UNMATCH’) which corresponds
to commit to chose the opposite action of the one chosen by agent 1. Suppose
that the final payoffs are given according to the right bottom table of Figure 1. In
the corresponding simultaneous-move game, full participation is a STRONG-Nash
equilibrium where agents are using dominant-strategies. Moreover, for the ‘column
agent 2’, participation is a super-dominant strategy: the minimum possible payment
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when participating is strictly greater than the maximum possible payment under
nonparticipation. By the maxmin argument, it is clear that participation has to be
his final action. However, it does not imply that the ‘row agent 1’ always play a
best response to his opponent super-dominant action as it occurs in the extensive
version 3: in any subgame-perfect equilibrium, agent 2 chooses the ‘UNMATCH’
move which is followed by YES and the final payoffs are corresponding to the profile
(NP,P ) an outcome which is preferred by agent 2 and that he can impose by making
the threat not to participate if the other do so.12 Such a threat is available when
we consider the general class of PG à la Kalai. In certain environments we may
feel uncomfortable since it require the ability to violate sone basic renegotiation-
proofness criteria: after observing the irreversible participation decision of agent
1, agent 2 would prefer to participate. It will be a motivation for considering in
section 5 the class of games with ‘subsequent opportunities and perfect information’
where such counterintuitive results do not occur. Finally the simultaneous-move PG
belongs also to the class of PGs which guarantees that the following definition of an
extensively robust implementable mechanism is stronger than the standard notion
of an implementable mechanism.
Definition 5 (extensively robust implementation) A mechanism is extensively
subgame-perfect robust implementable if it is feasible and if in every participation
game a subgame-perfect equilibrium exists such that full participation is the final
outcome.
Our extensively robust implementation concept differs in two ways from Kalai’s
approach. In one way, Kalai’s approach seems more demanding since it does not
solely require the existence of an equilibrium leading to the desired strategy profile,
as it happens full participation, but that every strategy profile where every agents fol-
low an adaptation of the participation strategy is an equilibrium profile. In another
way, Kalai’s approach is less demanding since equilibria in the extensive versions are
not required to be subgame-perfect. In our framework where the robustness criterium
12In a class of games with endogenous commitment, Caruana and Einav [7] obtain also the
possibility for the agent with the super-dominant strategy to discipline his opponent not to use his
dominant best response (our payoff table corresponds exactly to their example in section 4.3.2).
The commitment of agent 2 to a credible punishment to a deviant agent 1 does not arise through
the richness of the extensive versions as here but because actions’ switches are becoming more and
more costly over time.
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is restricted to a pure strategy equilibrium in complete information, the first differ-
ence becomes innocuous since all pure strategy equilibria in the simultaneous-move
game survives (but may not be subgame-perfect) in the extensive versions and where
agents are following an adaptation of their original strategy in the simultaneous-
move game.13 The standard implementation concept in the simultaneous-move PG
is thus equivalent to the extensively robust without subgame-perfection implemen-
tation concept that can be obviously defined in the same way (and exactly as in
Kalai’s papers). Next proposition recalls the characterization of the optimal mecha-
nisms according to those weaker implementation criteria as a benchmark. Jehiel et
al [20] show that such a full surplus extraction result can still be obtained with more
stringent implementation criteria, e.g. requiring agents to use dominant strategies.
Proposition 3.1 (Full Surplus Extraction à la Jehiel et al [20]) A mechanism
is implementable if and only if it is extensively robust without subgame-perfection im-
plementable. Any optimal design (a, t) is such that:
• a(N) is an efficient allocation
• ti(N) = V a(N)i − V ∗i (N \ {i}) for any i ∈ N .








i (N \ {i}).
3.3 Clarifying remarks
3.3.1 The set of Participation Games
The set of PGs in definition 4 may seem excessively large. We give below three
possible additional properties such that our analysis in section 4, 5 and 7 would not
be modified under those additional restrictions as the reader can check in our proofs.
Additional Properties:
5. B is a game of perfect information: all moves (including nature’s moves) are
publicly observable. 6. Any asymmetry between some agents in a PG should result
from asymmetric actions between those agents: at each node the action and infor-
mation set of players that have used the same strategy in the past should correspond
13Kalai considers equilibria of the simultaneous-move game where players’ strategies may contain
some randomness (resulting from explicit mixed strategies or from private information) and the
first difference then matters in his framework.
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up to a permutation of their identities. 7. The game does not include any moves
from external players (e.g. any nature’s moves). Nevertheless, our foundation for
our implementation criteria formalized in propositions 6.1 and 6.2 relies on games
with nature’s moves.
3.3.2 The set of Mechanisms
In the standard mechanism design framework with simultaneous-move participa-
tion and with complete information on the payoff structure, the restriction to direct
mechanisms that depend only on the set of participants and where full participation
is the final equilibrium outcome is w.l.o.g. as it is well-known from the ‘Revela-
tion Principle’. The argument is the following. Consider a game B where a given
vector of payoffs is an equilibrium outcome and the nonparticipation strategy has
a B-adaptation. Then build the ‘reduced’ mechanism where the set of strategies is
reduced to be binary: nonparticipation corresponds to the B-adaptation of nonpar-
ticipation while participation corresponds to the equilibrium strategy in B. The final
outcome for a strategy profile s is defined as the final outcome in the original game
with the strategies corresponding to s. From assumption (1) and since the original
mechanism was feasible, this direct mechanism is feasible. Full participation is also
an equilibrium since the new game corresponds to the original one with a truncated
set of strategies such that the set of possible deviations is narrower. We emphasize
that such a ‘Revelation Principle’ logic can not be invoked with extensively robust
implementation: we do not consider equilibrium outcomes of a given game but of a
family of games.
4 Optimal Design with Partially-Specified Partici-
pation Games
In a complete information setup, ‘coalitional rents’ leading to partial surplus ex-
traction are surprising if the principal is able to offer ‘multilateral contracts’, i.e.
contracts that explicitly rely on the set of other agents accepting the contracts, as
assumed here. It contrasts with the way ‘multilateral contracts’ are perceived by
the ‘bilateral contract’ literature, e.g. Genicot and Ray [15] states that multilat-
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eral “contracts can effectively create prisoners’ dilemmas among the agents, sliding
them into the acceptance of low-payoff outcomes even in the absence of coordination
failure”. Our next result challenges this view by considering a new perspective on
what could be meant under the terminology ‘coordination failure’. It is true that
full surplus extraction can be obtained even if dominant strategy implementation is
required as shown by Jehiel et al [20] and thus for various weaker implementation
concepts meant to capture the absence of coordination failure as coalition-proofness,
rationalizability or coalitional rationalizibility. However, if coordination possibilities
are reflected by the narrower requirement that the equilibrium should be robust to
any extensive specification of the PG, then Theorem 1 shows that the principal may
not be able to extract the full surplus.
Theorem 1 Any extensively (subgame perfect) robust optimal mechanism (a, t) is
such that:
• a(N) corresponds to an efficient allocation
• there exists σ ∈ Σ(N) such that ti(N) = V a(N)i −V ∗i ({σ(1), . . . , σ(σ−1(i)−1)})
for any i ∈ N .









V ∗i ({σ(1), . . . , σ(σ−1(i)− 1)})
}
. (4)
The theorem does not provide explicitly the out of equilibrium outcomes and trans-
fers of an optimal mechanism. The second and third steps of the proof construct an
extensively robust mechanism for all solutions (α, σ) of the maximization program
(4). This program allows us to separate the choice of the final outcome α to the
choice of the optimal threat structure, which is indeed reduced to the choice of a
permutation that specifies the order according to which agents will be threatened
taken as given the participation decision of the agents that are lower in this or-
der. The optimal choice of α thus coincides with the maximization of the allocative
efficiency.
Corollary 4.1 Extensively (subgame-perfect) robust optimal mechanisms are effi-
cient.
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In general, the possibility to commit to a simultaneous-move PG leads to a
strictly greater payoff for the principal since V ∗i (S) is decreasing in S. Under exten-
sively robust implementation the set of optimal implementable threats is reduced to
V ∗σ(i)({σ(1), . . . , σ(i−1)}) for the agent σ(i) . Nevertheless, in a negative-externality-
free framework, the optimal threat V ∗i (N \ {i}) against agent i requires economic
an outcome a that is always feasible independently to the set of participant, i.e.
a ∈ A(∅), and is thus always equal to V ∗i ({σ(1), . . . , σ(σ−1(i)− 1)}). We obtain the
following corollary:
Corollary 4.2 In a negative-externality-free framework, the revenue raised under an
extensively robust optimal mechanism is equal to the full extraction revenue R∗Full.
Proof of Theorem 1
First Step
Proposition 4.3 An extensively robust implementable mechanism is necessary STRONG-
Nash implementable
Consider a mechanism (a, t) and suppose that it is extensively robust imple-
mentable but not STRONG Nash implementable, i.e. there exists a set S ( N and a
probability distribution µS(.) ∈ ∆(S) such that V a(N)i −ti(N) <PS′∈∆(S) [V a(S′)i − ti(S′)]× µS(S′)
for any i /∈ S and µS(N) < 1. Consider a PG where all the agents in S are deciding
first and irreversibly whether to participate or not in the mechanism in a first step
while the agents in N \ S do not play at this stage. In a second step the remain-
ing agents in N \ S are playing a PG given the decisions of the agents in S while
the agents in S do not play. The PG can thus be written as the sequence of two
games with perfect information and with a distinct set of players: G1 with the set S
and G2 with the set N \ S for respectively the first and second steps. Consider the
following modified PG: insert between G1 and G2 a sequential delagate/veto game
between the agents in N \ S in the case where all the agents in S have chosen to
participate in G1. At each node of this intermediary sequential game, the agents in
N \ S have to chose between agreeing to delegate their participation decision such
that the mutually profitable proposal µS(.) is implemented and vetoing the proposal.
If all the agents in S agree to delegate, then the final participation set is S ′ ⊃ S
with probability µS(S ′). On the contrary, if one agent vetoes the proposal, then the
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agents in N \S are playing the mechanism G2. Denote by B1 [B2] the original [mod-
ified] whole PG. First note that the modified PG is actually a PG: a B2-adaptation
of the participation strategy for an agent i ∈ S (respectively i ∈ N \ S) is the strat-
egy consisting in playing a B1-adaptation of the participation strategy (respectively
vetoing the proposal and then playing in the continuation game after a veto a B1-
adaptation of the participation strategy). Consider an equilibrium of the game B2
such that full participation is the final outcome. It implies that all the agents in
S are accepted the mechanism and that at the intermediary stages the proposal is
vetoed with probability 1. Consider the last node of the sequential veto game in the
case where all the previous agents in N \S have accepted the proposal then the last
agent should accept the proposal. By backward induction the best response of each
agent is to accept the proposal, which raises a contradiction with full participation
being an equilibrium outcome in B2.
Second Step
Proposition 4.4 Any strong Nash optimal mechanism (a, t) is such that:
• a(N) corresponds to an efficient allocation
• there exists σ ∈ Σ(N) such that ti(N) = V a(N)i − V ∗i (T σσ−1(i)) for any i ∈ N .






















subject to ∀S ⊂ N,maxi∈N\S {V a(N)i − ti(N)− V a(S)i } ≥ 0, where (a, t) is a
feasible mechanism.
We simplify this program by showing that we can restrict ourselves w.l.o.g. to
a subclass of implementable mechanisms which are fully characterized by a couple
(α, σ) ∈ A × Σ(N). Let us introduce a last useful notation: for a given set S ( N
and a permutation σ ∈ Σ(N), denote by j(S, σ) the smallest agent according to the
order σ that is not belonging to S. Formally, j(S, σ) = max {j ∈ N |T σj ⊂ S}. This
agent plays a key role in the subclass that we define below: if the set of participants
is S, the principal will inflict the minmax punishment to the agent j(S, σ).
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Definition 6 For (α, σ) ∈ A×σ(N), we define the (α, σ)- optimal threat mechanism
as the mechanism (a, t) defined in the following way:
• a(N) = α
• a(S) = a∗j(S,σ)(S), if S ( N
• ti(N) = V αi − V ∗i (T σσ−1(i)), for any i ∈ N
• ti(S) = 0, if S ( N , for any i ∈ N .
Those mechanisms can be interpreted in the following way: take one agent, σ(1),
and give him the incentive to participate independently to the participation decision
of the other agents by using the optimal threat among A(∅) ; then take another
agent, σ(2), and give him the incentive to participate taken as given that σ(1) surely
participates and independently to the participation decisions of the other agents in
N \ {σ(1)} by using the optimal threat among A({σ(1)}) ; and so on. In particular,
for the last agent, σ(N), in this new order σ, the principal uses the optimal threat
in A(N \ {σ(N)}) as in the optimal design with simultaneous participation.
We first show that this restricted class of mechanisms is a subset of the strong
Nash implementable mechanisms.
Lemma 4.1 Any (α, σ)- optimal threat mechanism is strong Nash implementable.
Proof It is immediately feasible by definition of a∗j(S,σ)(S) which is the minmax
punishment for agent j(S, σ) given the participation set S. Consider S ( N and the
agent j(S, σ) who does not belong to S. We have:
V
a(N)






σ−1(j(S,σ)))− V ∗j(S,σ)(S) ≥ 0.
The equality comes from the definition of tj(S,σ)(N) and because a(S) = a∗j(S,σ)(S).
The inequality is satisfied because T σσ−1(j(S,σ)) = {σ(1), . . . , σ(j(S, σ)− 1)} ⊂ S (the
inclusion comes from the definition of j(S, σ)). Thus we have proved that the strong
Nash inequalities hold. CQFD
Then we show in Proposition 4.5 that, for any strong Nash implementable mech-
anism (a, t), there exists an implementable mechanism that belongs to the class of
(α, σ)- optimal threat mechanisms and that raises at least the same utility level for
the principal while extracting more surplus from all the agents. As a corollary, there
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is no loss of generality to look at the rent extraction profile for an (α, σ)- optimal
threat mechanism when we are characterizing the rent extraction profile of optimal
mechanism.
Proposition 4.5 For any strong Nash implementable mechanism (a, t), there exists
a strong Nash implementable mechanism that belongs to the class of (α, σ)- optimal
threat mechanisms and that raises at least the same utility level for the principal and
more surplus for all the agents.
Proof For a given mechanism (a, t), we define a corresponding (α, σ)- optimal
threat mechanism in the following way: α = a(N), σ is defined by induction such
that
• σ(1) = Argmaxi∈N {V a(N)i − ti(N)− V a(∅)i } (initial step)
• σ(i) = Argmaxi∈N\{σ(1),...,σ(i−1)} {V a(N)i − ti(N)− V a({σ(1),...,σ(i−1)})i } (inductive
step).
The map σ is by definition a permutation. From lemma 4.1, the (α, σ)- optimal
threat mechanism is implementable. It remains to show that it raises a greater utility
for the principal than the original mechanism (a, t), while extracting more surplus
from each agent. Let t(α,σ)i (N) be the transfer for agent i in the (α, σ)- optimal
threat mechanism at equilibrium. We have:
t
(α,σ)
i (N) = V
a(N)
i − V ∗i (T σσ−1(i)) ≥ V a(N)i − V
a(Tσ
σ−1(i))
i ≥ ti(N). (5)
The first equality results from the definition of t(α,σ)i (N) and that α = a(N). The
first inequality comes from the definition of the map V ∗i (.) and since a(T σσ−1(i)) ∈
A(T σσ−1(i)). (a, t) being strong Nash implementable implies that the strong Nash
inequalities (2) are satisfied, in particular for the set T σσ−1(i), i.e.
max
j∈N\{σ(1),...,σ(σ−1(i)−1)}
{V a(N)j − tj(N)− V a({σ(1),...,σ(σ
−1(i)−1)})
j } ≥ 0.
The construction of σ(i) guarantees that the expression in the ‘max’ is positive
for j = σ(i), i.e. V a(N)σ(i) − V
a(Tσ
σ−1(i))
σ(i) ≥ tσ(i)(N). Finally, we have proved the last
inequality in equation (5). To sum up, we have proved that α = a(N) and t(α,σ)i (N) ≥
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ti(N) for all agents. The utility level of the principal is thus also higher in the (α, σ)-
optimal threat mechanism we have constructed than in (a, t). CQFD
Third Step
Next proposition states that the existence of an order such that, for all agents,
the full participation outcome is the best outcome among all possible outcomes con-
ditional on the consent of the smaller agents according to this order is a sufficient
condition for being extensively robust implementable.
Proposition 4.6 For a given mechanism (a, t), suppose that there exists a permu-
tation σ ∈ Σ(N) such that Ui(N) ≥ Ui(S) for all set S ⊃ T σσ−1(i) and for any agent
i ∈ N , where Ui(S) = V a(S)i − ti(S), then the mechanism (a, t) is extensively robust
implementable.
Proof Consider a finite extensive game B. We build a strategy profile γ =
(γ1, · · · , γn) for the agents in N in the following way. For all i ∈ N denote by Hσi
the set of histories from agent i’s point of view occurring with possible probability
when the agents in T σi are all assumed to play a B-adaptation of the participation
strategy. Consider the following game B′ among the agents in N and an external
player that is indifferent to the final outcome: the game corresponds exactly to B
except that at the nodes where a given player i makes a choices and that belong to
Hσi then it is the external player that makes player i’s choice and that for any i ∈ N .
In other words, it is the game as all agents σ(i), i ∈ N , were ‘forced’ by an
external player to play an adaptation of the participation strategy on the histories
Hσi . Note that this ‘artificial’ game B′ is not a participation game but is a finite
extensive game with perfect recall. From Selten [39] such a game has thus at least
one subgame-perfect equilibrium. Moreover, since the external player is indifferent
to the final outcomes, there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium for any strategy
profile of the external player, in particular the one where he plays a B-adaptation
of the participation strategy of the original player. Consider such an equilibrium
profile γ′ of B′. This profile specifies strategies for all agent i for histories that
do not belong to Hσi . Finally define γi as corresponding to a B-adaptation of the
participation strategy on any history h ∈ Hσi and to γ′i otherwise. We claim that the
strategy profile γ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Out of the equilibrium path best
response to some beliefs is guaranteed since γ′ is supposed to be an equilibrium. On
the equilibrium path, consider a deviation by agent i ∈ N : the best outcome he can
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reach is maxS⊃Tσi Uσ(i)(S) (given the equilibrium belief that all the agents in T
σ
i will
finally participate) which is smaller than his equilibrium outcome Uσ(i)(N). CQFD
We conclude by joining the three steps. Consider an optimal strong Nash mech-
anism. From proposition 4.5 the same rent extraction profile can be raised with
an (α, σ)- optimal threat mechanism. Denote by α∗, σ∗ the corresponding optimal
allocation and ‘order’. Define the mechanism (a∗, t∗) as the (α∗, σ∗)- optimal threat
mechanism except for the out of equilibrium transfers ti(S) for S ( N which are
set such that ti(S) = V
a(S)
i − V ∗i (T σσ−1(i)) which guarantees that the sufficient condi-
tion from proposition 4.6 is satisfied (with an equality). Thus the extensively robust
implementable mechanism (a∗, t∗) implements the rent structure from this optimal
strong Nash implementable mechanism. We obtain Theorem 1 after noting that
any extensively robust implementable mechanism is STRONG Nash and thus strong
Nash implementable. CQFD
In the previous literature on mechanism design (with possibly incomplete infor-
mation), the set of constraints that makes a mechanism implementable, i.e. fea-
sibility, incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, results from
inequalities that are linear according to the mechanisms (a, t).14 Thus the set of
the mechanisms that are implementable is a convex set. Moreover, the payoff of the
principal depends linearly on the mechanism. From an optimal design perspective,
it is w.l.o.g. to consider mechanisms that are symmetric if the agents are symmetric.
Suppose that a given asymmetric mechanism m is optimal. Then consider the per-
mutations mσ of this mechanism where σ ∈ Σ(N). By symmetry, those mechanisms




implements the same revenue in a symmetric way. On the contrary, the set strong
Nash implementable mechanisms is not convex in general, except in externality-free
frameworks. Moreover, the set of optimal strong Nash implementable design are not
necessary convex, except in negative externality-free frameworks. As an example of
such a non-convexity, we can come back to the simple example of section 2. There
are two optimal way to extract agents’ surplus each corresponding to the two per-
mutations among two agents. However, in any (strict) mixture of those two optimal
14The implicit space structure according to which linearity applies is the following. For two
mechanisms, (a, t) and (a′, t′) and a real number λ ∈ [0, 1], the mechanism λ ·(a, t)+(1−λ) ·(a′, t′)
is the mechanism that implements the mechanism (a, t) (respectively (a′, t′)) with probability λ
(resp. (1− λ)).
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mechanisms, each agents would make a loss with regards to the allocation if they
both do not participate.
4.1 Partial versus Full implementation
In this paper, we mainly consider ‘partial implementation’ concepts, i.e. full par-
ticipation being an equilibrium. Let us discuss ‘full implementation’ concepts, i.e.
full participation being the unique equilibrium outcome. The formal way to adapt
the simultaneous-move implementation criteria in definition 3 is left to the reader.
The point that the partial and full simultaneous-move standard implementation cri-
terium differ is well known. For the more stringent strong Nash and STRONG Nash
implementation criteria, the difference is illustrated by the possible multiplicity of
those equilibrium concepts as illustrated by the ‘Battle of the sex’ game (Fig. 1.).
For definition 8, the natural concept for extensively robust full implementation is the
following: a mechanism is ‘extensively robust full subgame-pefect implementable’ re-
quires that full participation is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome for
any PG. Under extensively robust implementation criteria, partial and full implemen-
tation are not equivalent concepts as can be checked with the ‘Pure Coordination’
game in Figure 1. To simplify, we assume that, for a given utility level, an agent
strictly prefers to participate in the mechanism and to use an adaptation of the par-
ticipation strategy. With this trick, the sets of full implementable mechanisms are
closed sets and have thus an optimal element. In a nutshell, we assume:
Assumption 2 If an agent’s expected utility is the same under a given strategy and
an adaptation of the participation strategy, we assume that his preferences break
strictly in favor of the adaptation of the participation strategy.
Under extensively robust implementation criteria, the optimal designs that we
derived in the third step of the proof of Theorem 1 are also full implementable
under assumption 2. The agent σ(1) is indifferent to all final outcomes and will then
surely use an adaptation of the participation strategy in equilibrium from assumption
(2). Then given that the agent σ(2) is sure that agent σ(1) uses such a strategy in
equilibrium, he will also chose an adaptation of the participation strategy and so on.
Under our various simultaneous-move implementation criteria, it can also be easily
checked that full implementation requirement does not lower the principal’s revenue.
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Table 2: Surplus Extraction according to the class of games for partial and full
implementation concepts.
Class of Participation Games: Surplus Extraction
Simultaneous Partially-Specified (structure of the design)
Nash, Dominant Strategy R∗Full: Full
Coalition-Proof, Rationalizable a Nash Equilibrium (Prisoner Dilemma)
Coalitionally Rationalizable
strong Nash a subgame-perfect Nash R∗Partial: Partial
STRONG Nash Equilibrium, the unique (Divide & Conquer)
subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium
Our surplus extraction results derived in this section are summarized in Table 2.
5 A non-cooperative Foundation of strong Nash Im-
plementation
In this section we consider a slightly different set of PGs. First we enlarge the set
of PGs by considering that some agents may be non-strategic and are then playing
an adaptation of their participation strategy. Thus property 4. of definition 4 is
satisfied only for a subset of N , called the active or strategic agents whereas the
agents in the complementary set are ‘forced’ to participate. Second we narrow the
set of PGs by considering that any irreversible decision to participate from one
agent is followed by a participation subgame where all the remaining active agents
are perfectly informed of such a decision and where their strategies in the original
game are also preserved meaning in particular that they still have an opportunity to
participate. This subclass of PG is labeled as participation games with subsequent
opportunities and perfect information (henceforth PG with SO&PI), a terminology
chosen with regard to this second alteration which has a non-commitment flavor
which makes sense in light of the implicit impossibility for the seller to commit to
multi-stage games as argued in section 6.15
Definition 7 A participation game with subsequent opportunities and perfect infor-
mation (PG with SO&PI) of the mechanism (a, t) is any finite extensive game B
(with perfect recall) satisfying the properties 1., 2. and 3. of the definition of a
participation game of (a, t) and with property 4. being replaced by:
4’. Some nature’s moves determine a partition (S1, S2) of N where S1 is a
set of non-strategic agents that are ‘forced’ to participate at the end and S2 is the
15The first alteration comes from technical motivations as it will be clarified below.
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set of strategic agents who are satisfying the ‘preservation of the original strategies’
property 4. from definition 4.
Moreover the additional ‘subsequent opportunities and perfect information’ prop-
erty is required: after some players are definitely committed to participating in the
mechanism independently of the opponents’ actions, then the subgame between the
remaining players is such that it is common knowledge that those players partici-
pates in the mechanism and that the remaining players belonging to S2 still have
a B-adaptation of the original strategies (no matter what strategies are used by the
opponents).
Whereas the extensive version 1 of Figure 2 provides an example of a PG with
SO&PI, the extensive versions 2 and 3 fail to satisfy the SO&PI property. Version
2 corresponds to a simple switch of the participation and nonparticipation decisions
from version 1: after agent 1 playing ‘NO’ and agent 2 playing ‘YES’, no opportunity
is left to agent 1 to revise his participation decision. Due to the symmetry between
versions 1 and 2, it appears that the SO&PI property creates an asymmetry between
the action consisting in agreeing and refusing the mechanism.
Definition 8 A mechanism is extensively [full] subgame-perfect robust implementable
with subsequent opportunities and perfect information if it is feasible and if in ev-
ery participation game with subsequent opportunities and perfect information a [the
unique] subgame-perfect equilibrium exists such that full participation is the final out-
come.
Note that the simultaneous-move game is not a PG with SO&PI. However, the
property that “any extensively robust implementable mechanism with subsequent op-
portunities and perfect information is implementable” is still satisfied due to property
4’ which opens the possibility that a given player’s opponents are all non-strategic
guarantees that participation is a best reply when all the other players participate.
The following proposition provides a characterization of extensively robust im-
plementation in the class of PGs with SO&PI which is a great simplification from a
practitioner’s point of view: the implicit (uncountable) set of constraints from exten-
sively robust implementation criteria can be replaced by the finite set of constraints
corresponding to the ‘strong Nash’ equilibrium constraints.
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Theorem 2 The strong Nash implementation criterium is equivalent to the follow-
ing two implementation criteria in the class of participation games with subsequent
opportunities and perfect information:
• extensively robust implementable
• extensively robust full subgame-perfect implementable
The equivalence between the full implementation property with the strong Nash
equilibrium property is surprising with regards to the possible multiplicity of equilib-
ria satisfying the strong Nash property. Consider for example the ‘Battle of the Sex’
(Fig 1.), the game is completely symmetric with respect to the labeling of the actions
(up to a permutation of the label of the agents), the strong Nash property of the
full participation equilibrium is thus also satisfied by the full non-participation equi-
librium. However, if you consider a PG with SO&PI and in particular those where
all agents are active, all equilibrium outcomes involve full participation leaving thus
no room for the non-participation equilibrium of the simultaneous-move PG. This
result comes from the irreversible nature of participation decisions in the PGs with
SO&PI: if the ‘row player’ chooses to participate, he knows that the ‘column player’
will have the opportunity to ‘renegotiate’ his previous participation decisions: he
will be able to chose to participate and will actually do it since it is a best-reply to
his irreversible commitment to participate.
Since the ‘strong Nash implementable’ optimal design program has been solved in
Proposition 4.4, we immediately obtain the solutions for the ‘extensively robust im-
plementable’ and ‘extensively robust full subgame-perfect implementable’ programs
which thus correspond to the ones from the larger class of PGs in Theorem 1. In an
externality-free framework, the individual rationality constraints 1 are sufficient for
the strong Nash constraints 2 and thus being implementable is equivalent to being
strong Nash implementable. We obtain thus the following corollary:
Corollary 5.1 Any extensively robust implementable mechanism with subsequent
opportunities and perfect information is implementable. In an externality-free frame-
work, the converse holds: a mechanism that is implementable is extensively robust
implementable with subsequent opportunities and perfect information.
Proof of Theorem 2
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‘Sufficiency’ part The sufficiency part is proved by induction on the cardinality
of the set of agents that are not (irreversibly) committed to participating to the
mechanism. The induction hypothesis Hk for k ∈ [0, n] is:
Hk: Consider any set S ⊂ N such that ]S = k, if the strong Nash constraints
maxi∈S′ {V a(N)i − ti(N)− V a(N\S
′)
i } ≥ 0 are satisfied for any S ′ ⊂ S, then full par-
ticipation is the only subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome for any PG with SO&PI
given the consent of the agent in N \ S.
The initial hypothesisH0 is a tautology. Now consider a set S ⊂ N such that ]S =
k+1 and assume that the strong Nash constraints maxi∈S′ {V a(N)i − ti(N)− V a(N\S
′)
i } ≥ 0 are
satisfied for any S ′ ⊂ S. Assume however that there exists a PG with SO&PI given
the consent of the agent in N \ S and a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that
differs from full participation. From the induction hypothesis Hk and since the game
is supposed to belong to the class of PGs with SO&PI, the only candidates to be a
final equilibrium outcomes are either N \S or N .16 From the strong Nash constraint
relative to the coalition S, no agent in S is strictly better under the final outcome
with the set of participants N \ S. Full participation is then the unique equilibrium
outcome (since we have assumed that indifference breaks in favor of participation).
We conclude after noting that the hypothesis Hn corresponds to strong Nash imple-
mentation implying extensively robust full subgame-perfect implementation.
‘Only If’ Part Consider a mechanism (a, t) and suppose that it is not strong
Nash implementable. Consider then a ‘minimal’ coalition S such that the strong
Nash constraint with respect to the set of participant S is violated. That is:
• V a(S)i > V a(N)i − ti(N), for all i ∈ S
• maxi∈N\S′ {V a(N)i − ti(N)− V a(S
′)
i } ≥ 0 for any S ′ ( S.
We then carefully build a PG such that full participation is never a subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcome which proves that (a, t) is not extensively robust implementable.
The PG B we build has the following structure: first all agents in N \ S are forced
irreversibly (by nature’s move) to participate to the mechanism and their partici-
pation decisions are then common knowledge; second a carefully designed PG with
SO&PI is played with the remaining agent in S given the consent of the agents in
16If an additional agent participate, then the other agent can not commit to any behavior, the
key element of our refinement to PGs with SO&PI.
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N \S. Such a game is defined by induction on the cardinality of the set of the agents






















Figure 3: Tree of G(l1,··· ,lm)S
-terminal nodes
For a given mechanism (a, t), denote by G(l1,··· ,lm)S the PG between the agents in
the ordered list (l1, · · · , lm) and given the consent of the agents in S = N\{l1, · · · , lm}
which is properly defined by the following induction hypothesis. See Figure 3 for the
tree depicting the game G(l1,··· ,lm)S . Version 1 of Figure 1 corresponds to the special
case G(1,2)∅ . In the following m = ]N \ S.
There are three kinds of positions in G(l1,··· ,lm)S :
1. Responder nodes of the form (li, S), where S ⊂ N is the set of the agents that
have previously accepted the mechanism and li ∈ N \ S is the identity of the
potential participant with the initiative.
2. Intermediate nodes of the form G(l1,··· ,li−1,li+1,··· ,lm)S∪{li} , which corresponds to a par-
ticipation subgame given the additional consent of agent li to the set S.
3. Terminal nodes of the form (a, t, S) where S is the set of the agents that have
previously accepted the mechanism (a, t).
At an intermediate node G(l1,··· ,li−1,li+1,··· ,lm)S∪{li} , agents have no choice and the game
moves to the responder node (l1, S ∪ {li}) for i ≥ 2 ((l2, S ∪ {l1}) for i = 1) if
m > 1 or moves to the terminal node (a, t, N) if all agents give their consent, i.e. if
m = 1. At a terminal node (a, t, S), the game ends and the outcome (a(S), t(S)) is
implemented. At any responder position (li, S) there is the choice:
1. (li+1, S) if i < m, where li+1 is the smaller index in N \S that is bigger than li.
It means that agent li delays participation and li+1 becomes the new responder.
It corresponds to the two first arrays (NO) at the left of Fig. 3.
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2. (a, t, S) if i = m which means that agent lm refuses participation and the game
ends at this terminal node. It corresponds to the array (NO) at the extreme
right of Fig. 3.
3. G(l1,··· ,li−1,li+1,··· ,lm)S∪{li} which means that agent li accepts the mechanism and the
game moves to the intermediate node G(l1,··· ,li−1,li+1,··· ,lm)S∪{li} . It corresponds to the
arrays (YES) in Fig. 3.
We also assume that the game is of perfect information meaning that all moves are
publicly observed.
By applying the Hm−1 induction hypothesis to the games G
(l1,··· ,li−1,li+1,··· ,lm)
S∪{li} (i ∈
N \ S) which are PGs with SO&PI, where S is the ‘minimal’ coalition such that
the all the strong Nash constraints with respect to strict subset of S are satisfied,
we obtain that choosing to participate in the responder nodes (li, S) will necessary
lead to full participation at equilibrium for any i ∈ N \ S. By backward induction
from lm to l1 we obtain then that all agents in {l1, · · · , lm} prefer not to accept
the mechanism at the nodes (li, S). Then full participation in not an equilibrium
outcome in the game G(l1,··· ,lm)S . CQFD
The proof of Theorem 2 should be slightly adapted if Property 6. is added to
the definition of PGs (see subsection 3.3.1). In the ‘Only If’ part of Theorem 2 the
games G(l1,··· ,lm)S are not symmetric. They could be replaced by games where the
players (l1, · · · , lm) are simultaneously asked m-times whether they accept to pre-
commit to participate and where only m positive pre-commitment are validating the
participation strategy. The sequential nature of the pre-commitments allows us to
get rid of the bad coordination equilibria resulting from simultaneous play.
6 Foundation of our implementation criteria
First we argue that the restriction to direct, i.e. one-shot, mechanism makes
sense in the perspective that the principal has a very limited commitment power: she
cannot commit to any multi-stage game on the contrary to the full implementation
literature, e.g. she is unable to commit to a continuation game that depends on some
initial participation decisions. In other words, she cannot commit not to change the
rule of the game after observing some participation report, but can rather only
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commit to direct mechanisms. The final outcomes in A should be interpreted as
a reduced form approach that captures possible commitment from the principal to
certain given actions (possibly mixed) as in Gomes and Jehiel [16]. If she can commit
to any multi-stage game (while leaving room for ‘coalitional constraints’ at each
stage), the principal would be able to reach full surplus extraction à la Jehiel et al
[20] by inviting sequentially each agent individually and committing to impose the
tougher threat in case of nonparticipation through the continuation game in the later
stages.
Second, since agents may be privately informed on the PG they are playing in
the general class of PGs we consider, we can wonder whether it could be profitable
for the principal to propose ‘general direct mechanisms’ where the participants are
reporting some types. LetMP denote the finite message space of participating agents.
Then a ‘general direct mechanism’ denoted by (a, t) is a mapping that specifies a
final outcome a(m) and a vector of monetary transfers t(m) for each possible set of
reportsm ∈ (MP∪{mNP})n, wheremNP corresponds to the nonparticipation action.
Let M = MP ∪ {mNP}. The definition of a PG B for a general direct mechanism
(a, t) can be naturally adapted from definitions 4 by requiring in particular that any
report m ∈M has at least one B-adaptation. The corresponding extensively robust
implementation concept extends in an obvious way.
Third, to implement some revenue, it is not clear that there is no loss of generality
to consider mechanisms where full participation is always an equilibrium outcome.
The equilibrium outcome may depend both on the history of play of the agents that
may use mixed strategies and on the PG in hand while still raising at least the
targeted revenue.
Though the ‘Revelation Principle’ paradigm does not apply in our framework, we
give an answer to the two last objections. Next proposition show that the optimal
revenue R∗Partial that can be raised under our restricted implementation criterium and
that is characterized in Theorem 1 remains optimal in the wider class of mechanisms
with possibly some reports and a set of participants that may depend on the PG
in hand. We give thus a foundation for the implementation criterium considered in
the analysis developed in section 4. The proofs in this section are relegated in the
appendix.
Proposition 6.1 There is no feasible general direct mechanism and no revenue R >
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R∗Partial such that, for any participation game and any positive measure on nature’s
moves, there exists an equilibrium leading to an expected revenue that is bigger than
R.17
The following proposition is the analog of proposition 6.1 for PG with SO&PI.
For simplification purposes we do not consider general direct mechanisms but only
consider implementation beyond the full partiicpation equilibrium.18
Proposition 6.2 There is no feasible direct mechanism and no revenue R > R∗Partial
such that, for any participation game in the class of participation games with sub-
sequent opportunities and perfect information and any positive measure on nature’s
moves, there exists an equilibrium leading to an expected revenue that is bigger than
R.19
We emphasize that this foundation is not a worst case scenario with regards to
both the participation games and the players moves. The nature’s move is nev-
ertheless included in the worst case scenario, more precisely on a motive measure.
Nature’s moves could have been incorporated in the definition of a PG game which
would have allowed for non-rational expectations or heterogenous beliefs that we
wanted to avoid to impose directly for clarification purposes.20
7 Partial subgame-perfection
In proposition 3.1 we argued that the standard implementation criterium is equiv-
alent to the extensively robust criterium without subgame perfection. It can be eas-
ily shown that this equivalence still holds when we consider the class of PGs with
SO&PI. On the other hand, theorem 2 establishes that the strong Nash implementa-
tion criterium is equivalent to the extensively (subgame-perfect) robust criterium in
17PGs are assumed to be finite which guarantees that nature’s moves are isomorphic to an
Euclidian space. The measure in the proposition refers then to the Lebesgue measure.
18The way to adapt the definition 7 of a PG with SO&PI for general direct mechanisms is less
straightforward and more subject to discussions. If we consider that nonstrategic agents may be
forced to play any action m ∈ MP then the proof of proposition 6.2 can be adapted to general
direct mechanisms.
19See footnote 17
20In the previous versions of the paper, such a foundation was obtained with a sledgehammer
argument: by relaxing directly the common knowledge assumptions on the game that is played,
more precisely by enlarging the set of possible beliefs à la Mertens-Zamir [30], while still assuming
that it was common knowledge that the game was a PG with SO&PI.
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the class of PGs with SO&PI. In a nutshell, the two extreme requirements in term
of explicit ‘coalitional constraints’ -robustness to individual deviations or to devia-
tions from any coalitions- are corresponding exactly to the two extreme rationality
requirements in term of subgame-perfection when robustness to all extensive versions
of the simultaneous-move PG is considered. Nash equilibrium imposes best responses
only on the equilibrium path while subgame perfection requires best responses for
any possible histories. We consider below partial subgame-perfection where best
responses are imposed only on histories that are ‘closed to the equilibrium path’.
The closeness to the equilibrium path for a given agent is reflected by the number of
opponent players that have surely deviated from their equilibrium strategy given his
current information. Though similar, our ‘p-subgame-perfect’ equilibrium concept
differs from Kalai and Neme [24]’s concept where it is the total number of deviations
that is considered.21
Definition 9 For a given PG, a strategy f = (f1, · · · , fm) is a p-subgame-perfect
equilibrium (p a nonnegative integer) if for all i = 1, · · · ,m, fi is a p-perfect response
to f , i.e. for any history hi that belongs to the set of histories where player i is sure
that less than p of his opponents players have deviated then fi|hi is a best-response.
Basic property: In any game with m active players, being a m − 1-subgame
perfect equilibrium is equivalent with being a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We naturally adapt our extensively robust implementation concepts to partial
subgame perfection concept by replacing ‘subgame-perfect’ by ‘p-subgame-perfect’
in the corresponding definitions. The following theorem establishes an equivalence
between being extensively p-subgame-perfect robust implementable and the robust-
ness of the simultaneous-move PG to coalition of size p + 1 which is labeled as
p+ 1-strong Nash implementable.
Theorem 3 A mechanism (a, t) is extensively p-subgame-perfect robust implementable
in the class of participation games with subsequent opportunities and perfect infor-
mation if and only if (a, t) is (p+ 1)-strong Nash implementable, i.e.
max
i∈N\S
{V a(N)i − ti(N)− V a(S)i } ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ N with ](N \ S) ≤ p+ 1. (6)
21Example 1 in the supplementary material clarifies why we do not consider their concept.
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When p < n − 1, such an equivalence between p-strong Nash implementation and
extensively p − 1-subgame perfect robust implementation holds naturally only for
the partial implementation concept and not the full implementation concept on the
contrary to Theorem 2.22
Proof of Theorem 3
‘Sufficiency’ Part Suppose that (a, t) is not p-strong Nash and consider then
a ‘minimal’ coalition S such that the strong Nash constraint is violated in the same
way as in the proof of the ‘Only If’ part of Theorem 2. Consider then exactly the
same PG with SO&PI where only the agents in S are active players. In that game we
have shown previously that full participation is never a subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome and thus never a p−1-subgame perfect equilibrium outcome from the basic
property.
‘Only If’ Part Consider a p-strong Nash implementable mechanism. Denote
by Hi(S) the set of histories for player i such that exactly the players in the set S
(including himself) are not definitely committed to participating to the mechanism.
For any PG with SO&PI B, for any player i and immediately after the release of some
opponents’ participation such that h ∈ Hi(S), consider fPi (S) (respectively fNPi (S))
a B-adaptation of the participation strategy (the non-participation strategy) which
are existing from our definition of a PG with SO&PI. Consider the following strategy,
denoted by fi, for player i, in any history h ∈ Hi(S) with ]S ≥ p + 1 follow the
strategy fPi (S). In an history h ∈ Hi(S) with ]S ≤ p, follow the strategy fPi (k) if
V
a(N)
i −ti(N)−V a(S)i ≥ 0 and fNPi (S) otherwise. We claim that f = (f1, · · · , fn) is a
p− 1-subgame-perfect equilibrium. Note that it leads surely to the full participation
outcome. PGs are not in general games of ‘perfect information’ and the ‘one-shot
deviation principle’ does not apply. However, we are considering a strategy profile
where each player strategy depends only on a public information, as it happens the
set of agents that has agreed to participate whose public information nature comes
from the SO&PI property, and where it is thus sufficient for checking the global
optimality of a player strategy to check its robustness according to deviations on
local histories where the set of participants has not changed. Consider a deviation
for player i in an history h ∈ Hi(S) with ]S ≥ p + 1, it modifies the final outcome
only if at least p other players have deviated from their equilibrium strategies and it
22By means of the proof of Theorem 2, we can precisely build a game with a subgame perfect
equilibrium such that full participation is never an equilibrium outcome.
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is thus a p − 1 perfect (weakly) best response. Consider a deviation for player i in
an history h ∈ Hi(S) with ]S ≤ p.
Consider first the case where V a(N)i − ti(N)− V a(S)i ≥ 0. Since the final outcome
is either full participation (if at least one the players in S agrees to participate) or
full non-participation of the player in S, then the adaptation of the participation
strategy at this stage is a dominant response for i (possibly a weakly best response)
and thus a p− 1 best response independently of any possible deviations in the initial
stage of the game. Consider then the case where V a(N)i − ti(N) − V a(S)i < 0, the
adaptation of the non-participation is a dominant response. Finally we have checked
that players’ strategies are p− 1 best responses at the equilibrium profile. CQFD
We emphasize that we provide a foundation for the strong Nash constraints and
not the STRONG Nash constraints. The former are corresponding to the notion of
‘viable coalitions’ discussed by Schelling [35]. While having some intuitive appeal
their theoretical status was unclear up to this point and present the weakness that
if the idea is that some exogenous coalition could be at work then there is no reason
to exclude more sophisticated devices in the coalition that would allow randomiza-
tion and correlated strategies. Being immune to such critics the STRONG Nash
constraints would have seemed more satisfactory at first glance.
We do not have a ‘nice’ and easily interpretable characterization of p-strong Nash
optimal designs for 1 < p < n as in propositions 3.1 and 4.4 for the cases p = 1 and
p = n and thus not of extensively p−1-subgame perfect robust optimal designs. The
p-strong Nash optimal design program is discussed in the supplementary material: a
mild simplification in the vain of Proposition 4.4 is given and the difficulties for any
further characterization are illustrated by an example.
8 Additional Comments
As illustrated by the example in section 2, an important class of applications
where our ‘coalitional constraints’ are binding are auctions with negative external-
ities as in Jehiel et al [19, 20, 21]. This final section briefly discusses other general
applications where our implementation criteria may provide new benchmarks.
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8.1 Collusion in mechanism design
Our analysis can be useful in two aspects for the literature on collusion in mech-
anism design.
First robustness to partially specified PG can be also interpreted as a robustness
criterium against collusive devices for the agents when neither binding agreements
nor transfers are available, making our worst case scenario implementation crite-
ria more relevant if we have in mind that a third party can design the PG. Main
contributions on collusion-proof implementation as Laffont and Martimort [25] and
Che and Kim [9] preclude any collusion on the participation decisions themselves
and restrict the collusive activity to the reports. In this literature, the collusion
technologies allow agents to fully contract (with monetary transfers) their reports
to the principal. Surprisingly, Che and Kim [9] show that optimal non-collusive
mechanism can be made collusion-proof in a broad class of circumstances including
economic environment with allocative externalities. On the one hand our collusive
device is much weaker: neither monetary transfers nor binding agreements on the
reports are available. On the other hand, it includes participation decisions. We
show that in general extensively robust optimal design raises a strictly lower revenue
than standard optimal design.23
Second, in the recent mechanism design literature on collusion as in Che and Kim
[9], one agent (or a third party) proposes a mechanism that can be vetoed by each
agent. When an agent breaks the collusion process, the game is played in a non-
cooperative way under passive-beliefs. Thus contrary to the mainstream mechanism
design literature, the principal is significantly limited in the way she can punish non-
participants. In an auction framework, Caillaud and Jehiel [6] relax slightly this veto
power assumption by also considering the case where a defection leads to a collusive
report from the agents that are remaining in the collusion process. The reluctance to
adopt fully the standard mechanism design approach to model collusion may come
from the seemingly excessive commitment power that it implies and which is slightly
softened under our stronger implementation criteria.
Let us discuss those differences in a simple example under complete information:
23This result contrasts with the insights of Che and Kim [8] where the collusion mechanism
proposed by a third party takes place before the participation decisions and where the second best
is still implementable with collusion. We emphasize that [8] considers a negative-externality free
framework: the sale of a single item in the independent private value framework.
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a symmetric triopoly under Cournot competition. Each firm has a constant null
marginal cost and a maximum capacity qmax = 0.5. Inverse demand is given by
P = 1 − Q, where Q denotes the total quantity supplied. Without collusion, the
quantity supplied by each firm in equilibrium is equal to 1/4 and the corresponding
total profit of the triopoly is Πnc = 3/16. The collusive outcome corresponds to
the total production Q = 1/2 and the joint profit Πcol = 1/4. Suppose that a col-
lusion mechanism, which specifies the quantities produced by each participant and
balanced monetary transfers among participants for each possible set of participant,
is proposed by one firm, say 1. Under complete information, all the different models
lead to the collusive outcome in the optimal mechanism. Nevertheless, the distribu-
tion of the profits from collusion that can be implemented are different according to
the model for collusion. Under veto power, an assumption that is often made, each
firm is guaranteed to obtain her non-cooperative profit 1/16. The proposer is able
to capture all the rents from collusion Πcol − Πnc = 1/16. At the other extreme, if
a non-participant can be punished by the minmax punishment, then nonparticipant
can be threatened by the null payoff: the two remaining participants commit to pro-
duce q = 0.5 which leads to a null price. Nevertheless, this mechanism may seem
poorly convincing: firm 1 manages to extract all the surplus from trade (1/4) from
both firms by threatening each to flood the market with the help of the other one.
With our model, the maximal surplus that firm 1 can extract is intermediate: she
can extract the full surplus only to one firm and has to leave the surplus 1/36 to the
other one, the profit corresponding to the Cournot outcome after the commitment
to produce q = 0.5 by firm 1. Thus she should use a divide and conquer strategy.
8.2 Environments with imperfect commitment on future in-
teractions
Our analysis brings a new benchmark in environments where the underlying al-
location problem is negative-externality-free while the current environment is not
negative-externality-free: seemingly pure private value environments may entail neg-
ative externalities insofar as the principal lacks the ability to commit not to propose
a new mechanism if the first one fails to work. E.g. for the allocation of a pure
private good, McAfee and Vincent [29] and Skreta [41] assume that the seller cannot
commit never to attempt to resell the good if she fails to sell it. More generally,
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externalities are the norm in environment with imperfect commitment with respect
to future interaction, i.e. when long-term contracts are not available.
Gomes and Jehiel [16] consider a model of dynamic interactions in complete
information where, at each period, an agent is selected to make an offer to a subset
of the other agents to move the state of the economy. They do not only assume
that long-term contracts are not available but also restrict the analysis to simple-
offer contracts where each approached agent can veto the proposed move. Indeed,
as they emphasize, this restriction is with no loss of generality if a third party can
coordinate the approached agents by means of a ‘strong’ collusion contract with
transfers. With general contracts -i.e. without any form of collusion- the economy
moves immediately to the efficient state. On the contrary, with simple-offer contracts,
efficiency is no longer guaranteed. This negative result compared with the Coasian
intuition depends critically on the model for collusion. If collusion is modeled by
means of the extensively robust implementation criterium, then the transposition
of corollary 4.1 in their framework restores efficiency: all Markov Perfect Equilibria
of the economy with general spot contract that are extensively robust are efficient,
entailing an immediate move to the efficient state, where it remains forever. However,
under our milder collusion device, the expected payoff of the selected proposer is
lower than with general contracts. At the other extreme, under a mildly stronger
form of collusion where the third party can also contract with non-approached agents
and where collusion is not observable by the proposer, the economy also moves
immediately to the efficient state.
8.3 Binary games with externalities
Finally, our noncooperative foundation for the ‘strong Nash’ equilibrium concept
is not limited to mechanism design but can be exported to any games with binary
actions if one presents a kind of irreversibility and when there is perfect information
on such participation choices. Such games occur often in economics (adoption of a
technology, entry in a market) and also in politics (ratification of a treaty, recognition
of a country). The irreversibility is captured by an irreversible fixed cost that is
related to one action and/or to asymmetric switching costs: defectors from a contract
or a political agreement are severely punished by explicit (termination penalties) or
implicit (reputation effects) costs. For binary games without this irreversibility and
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where the modeler would not be comfortable with the restriction to PG with SO&PI
(see Schelling [35] for more examples in this area), propositions 4.3 and 4.6 can be
exported to check whether an equilibrium is robust.
8.4 Related insights with bilateral contracts with externali-
ties
We emphasize that our efficiency insight contrasts strongly with the recent lit-
erature on optimal bilateral contracts with externalities where the design of the
final outcome and the optimal threats cannot be separated and may thus lead to
a trade-off between efficiency and revenue extraction in complete information. On
the contrary, our insight in favor of discrimination -even in symmetric framework-
is already present in Genicot and Ray [15], Segal and Whinston [38], Segal [37] and
Winter [45]. Nevertheless, in those papers, discrimination comes from both the bi-
lateral nature of the contractual relationship and from severe coordination failures
(unique implementation).
Genicot and Ray [15] and Segal and Whinston [38] consider also frameworks
where contracting decisions may be sequential. However, the principal is assumed to
have full knowledge on the timing of the game contrary to our approach. In Segal
and Whinston [38], the principal can commit not to reapproach some agent after
some refusal and sequentiality then enlarges the set of payoffs that the principal
can implement since it breaks agents’ coordination. In Genicot and Ray [15], the
principal lacks the commitment to never approach an agent to whom an offer has
already been made and sequentiality then weakens the principal’s bargaining power.
8.5 Incomplete Information
We have restricted our analysis to a complete information setup with respect
to agents’ preferences. It is left for further research how to extend the notion of
extensively robust implementation in incomplete information setups in order to an-
alyze the interactions with the incentive compatibility constraints. The main issue
is whether the ‘coalitional constraints’ are beneficial or not to the welfare. As for
the concept of ratifiability introduced by Cramton and Palfrey [12], incomplete in-
formation requires a careful treatment of how agents revise their beliefs relative to
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the participation decisions of their opponents.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition [6.1]
We first introduce some additional notation. For m = (m1, · · · ,mn) ∈ Mn and
S ⊂ N denote by mS the vector of final messages reported by the agents in S.
For S ⊂ N , denote mSNP the vector of messages where all the agents in S do not
participate. Let S(m) = {i|mi ∈MP} be the set of participants that corresponds to
the vector of messagesm. LetK = maxi∈N maxa,a′∈A V ai − V a′i be an upper bound on
the maximal threats that can be imposed to a nonparticipant by subsequent changes
in the other agents reports, e.g. subsequent nonparticipating decisions. For S ⊂ N
let P(S) be the set of the subsets of S.
Consider a general direct mechanism denoted by (a, t) that specifies a final out-
come a(m) and a vector of monetary transfers t(m) for each possible set of reports
m ∈ Mn. Suppose that there exists a final outcome with a final set of messages m
such that the principal raises a strictly higher revenue than R∗Partial+n ·  for a given
set of reports, the following preliminary lemma establishes that there is a subset of
the participants such that all of its members would benefit at least  from a joint
deviation.
Lemma A.1 Consider a final set of messages m such that the revenue of the prin-
cipal is strictly bigger than R∗Partial+n · . Then there exists a subset S ⊂ S(m) such
that V a(m
N\S ,mSNP )
i − (V a(m)i − ti(m)) > , for any i ∈ S.
In the following we call such a set S ⊂ S(m) a set of -deviators.





i − ti(m)− V a(m
N\S ,mSNP )
i ≥ −. (7)
Then build a direct mechanism (a∗, t∗) with no reports in the following way:
• a∗(S) = a(m(N\S(m))∪S,mS(m)\SNP ), for all S ⊂ N
• t∗i (S) = 0, for all i /∈ (S ∩S(m)) and S ⊂ N
• t∗i (S) = t(m)− , for all i ∈ S ∩S(m) and S ⊂ N .
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i − t∗i (N)− V a
∗(N\S)
i ≥ 0.
If S ∩ S(m) 6= ∅, it is immediately satisfied since any i ∈ S ∩ S(m) 6= ∅ is
indifferent to the final outcome. For S ⊂ S(m), it comes from the inequalities (7).
Finally we have proved that the mechanism (a∗, t∗) is strong Nash implementable.
However it raises a revenue R− n ·  that is thus strictly bigger than R∗Partial which
raises a contradiction with proposition 4.4. CQFD
We will now raise a contradiction when a revenue R strictly higher than R∗Partial











(a(m), t(m)) (a(m), t(m)) (a(m), t(m))
V Gν(mN\S ,mSNP )
-responder nodes -nature’s move
Figure 4: Tree of V Gν(m)
-terminal nodes
For any general direct mechanism (a, t), we now construct by induction a finite
extensive ‘veto game’ parameterized by ν ∈ (0, 1), for any current set of messages m,
and denoted by V Gν(m). The induction is on the number of current participants, i.e.
the cardinal of the set S(m). See Figure 4. When this set is empty, the allocation
(a(m), t(m)) is implemented without any moves. Now consider that S(m) contains
at least one element. The game starts with a nature’s move each corresponding to an
element ofP(S(m)). The probability to move to the node corresponding to ∅ is equal
to 1−ν while the other moves are equally probable with probability ν
2]S(m)−1 . At the
node ∅ the game ends and the statu quo allocation (a(m), t(m)) is implemented. At
a node S = {s1, · · · , sk} ∈ P(S(m)) \ {∅}, the k agents in S are sequentially asked
whether they accept a proposal consisting in a joint deviation where they do not
participate or veto the proposal.24 If there is at least one veto, the game ends at the
statu quo allocation. If all the agents in S accept the proposal then the continuation
24The order in the sequence does not matter.
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game is the ‘veto game’ V Gν(mN\S,mSNP ) which is properly defined by the induction
hypothesis.
Let  ∈ (0, R−R∗Partial
n
) and ν ∈ (0, 1/2) such that  · (1− ν) − νK > 0. Consider
a PG B and then the modified game such that at each final node with a final set of
messages m of the original game B, the final set of messages m is publicly disclosed
and the game V Gν(m) is appended as a continuation game. The modified game is
also a PG.
In the veto games V Gν(m), consider a node where the current set of messages




i − ti(m) ≥ R∗Partial + n ·  and the sequential veto game
between the set of participants S such that S is a set of -deviators : any subgame
perfect equilibrium strategy profile is such that the agents in S are accepting the
joint deviation where the agents in S jointly do not to participate at each node
where all the previous responders are accepted the proposal. Consider the history
where all the agents in S except the last one have accepted the proposal to deviate.
If he accepts the proposal, then with probability 1 − ν he will surely win at least 
whereas with probability ν subsequent defections may change the final allocation. In
the worse case, he will loose K. Thus the last agent in the sequence in the veto game
should find it strictly profitable to accept the proposal. By backward induction, it
is true for all the agents in S.
With probability at least ( ν
2n−1)
n > 0, nature’s moves are such that the game
never ends at a final message m such that the principal’s revenue is strictly bigger
than R∗Partial+n ·: in at most n veto proposal stages, nature selects the node ∅ if the
revenue under the current set of messages is lower than R∗Partial+n ·  while it selects
a set of -deviators otherwise (a set whose existence is guaranteed by lemma A.1).
Note that in the case where all agents definitely do not participate, then the revenue
is necessarily lower than R∗Partial since no transfer can help the principal. Finally,
on a positive measure on nature’s move, the final outcome in any equilibrium of this
modified game always raises an expected revenue that is strictly lower than R which
raises a contradiction.
Remark Note that the proof extends immediately to general direct mechanisms
where nonparticipants can send messages that may impact the final outcome while
still imposing that the final allocation does belong to A(S(m)). Note also that
we do not use the point that the message space is finite. The generalization to
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arbitrary message spaces would only require to adapt the current definition of PGs
that assumes that the game is finite.
B Proof of Proposition [6.2]
Consider a direct mechanism (a, t) such that the expected revenue R is strictly
bigger than R∗Partial for an equilibrium of any PG with SO&PI and on any positive
measure with respect to nature’s moves. Let H = maxi∈N,S,S′⊂N (V a(S)i − ti(S))− (V a(S
′)
i − ti(S′))
be an upper bound on the maximal gain that an agent can expect by a deviation.
First note that from property 4’ of the definition of PG with SO&PI, this class





i − ti(N) > R∗Partial.
From lemma A.1 there exists a set S ⊂ N of -deviators ( > 0). Now consider S1
a set of 1-deviators (1 > 0) such that this set that is minimal, i.e. such that there is
no strict non empty subset of S1 that is a set of ′-deviators (′ > 0). Then consider
the PG such that all agents in N \ S1 are forced to play which is publicly disclosed
and the remaining agents are then playing a PG with SO&PI. In the same way as in
Theorem 2 the only equilibrium outcome is nonparticipation since the participation





i − ti(N \ S1) ≥ R∗Partial.
Repeating the same argument conditional on the fact that the agents in S1 will
surely not participate there is then a minimal set of deviators S2 among N \S1 with
the associated 2 > 0. By induction, we construct a partition (S1, S2, · · · , Sk) of N
such that given that the agents in S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Si−1 are forced to participate while the
agents in Si+1 · · · ∪ Sk are forced not to participate, then in any PG with SO&PI
among the agents Si the unique equilibrium outcome is nonparticipation.
Let  = mini=1,··· ,k i. Let α ∈ (0, 1) such that  · (1−α)−αH > 0. The nature’s
moves will have the following underlying structure: with probability αi · (1− α) the
set of nonstrategic agents will be Fi = N \ {S1 ∪ Si} for 1 ≤ i < k − 1 and with the
remaining probability αk all agents will be strategic Fk = ∅. We use the convention
48
that F0 = N .
We construct by induction a family of participation games G{l1,··· ,lm}Fj ,S (α), param-
eterized by α, where Fj (j = 1, · · · , k) is the set of nonstrategic agents as selected
by the nature’s moves and S ⊂ Sj, is a remaining set of agents that gave their con-
sent. Finally {l1, · · · , lm} the set of remaining potential participants. See Figure 5
for the tree depicting the game G{l1,··· ,lm}Fj ,S (α). The notation reflects the proximity to
the family of games G{l1,··· ,lm}S introduced in section 4. The induction is on m the
cardinal of the set of remaining potential participants. When there is no remaining
potential participants, i.e. m = 0, the game G∅N(α) coincides with the game G
∅
N , i.e.
ends at the full participation outcome.
-responder nodes -nature’s move







s = u+ 1, · · · , j
































There are four kinds of positions in G{l1,··· ,lm}Fj ,S (α):
1. Responder nodes of the form (li, Fj, S), where Fj ⊂ N is the set of the non-
strategic agents that have previously selected by nature’s move, S ⊂ Sj a set
of agent (whose strategic or nonstrategic nature is still not determined by the
nature) that have moved to accept the mechanism and li ∈ N \ {Fj ∪S} is the
identity of the potential participant with the initiative.
2. Intermediate nodes of the form G(l1,··· ,lm′ )Fs,S (α) or G
(l1,··· ,lm′ )
Fs,S
, where m′ < m
and s ≤ j which corresponds to a participation subgame given the additional
consent of some agents and possibly more nonstrategic agents.
3. Nature’s moves where a partition in the sets Fs, s = 1, · · · , j is selected.
4. Terminal nodes of the form (a, t, S) where S is the set of the agents that have
previously accepted the mechanism (a, t).
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At an intermediate node G(l1,··· ,lm′ )Fs,S (α) or G
(l1,··· ,lm′ )
Fs,S
, agents have no choice and
the game moves to the responder node (l1, Fs, S) for m′ > 0 or moves to the terminal
node (a, t, N) if all agents give their consent, i.e. if m = 0. At a terminal node
(a, t, S), the game ends and the outcome (a(S), t(S)) is implemented. At a nature’s
move, the probabilities with respect to the different draws are depicted in Figure 5
and are coherent with the underlying nature’s move structure described above. At
any responder position (li, Fj, S) there is the choice:
1. (li+1, S) if i < m, where li+1 is the smaller index in N \S that is bigger than li.
It means that agent li delays participation and li+1 becomes the new responder.
It corresponds to the three first arrays (NO) at the left of Fig. 5.
2. The nature’s move with the partition Fj, {Fs}s=1,··· ,j−1 and the probabilities as
depicted in Fig. 5 if i = m which means that agent lm refuses participation
and. It corresponds to the array (NO) at the extreme right of Fig. 5.
3. G{l1,··· ,lm}\{li′}Fj ,S∪{li′} (α) which means that agent li ∈ Sj accepts the mechanism and
the game moves to the intermediate node G{l1,··· ,lm}\{li′}Fj ,S∪{li′} (α). It corresponds to
the third array (YES) in Fig. 5.
4. The nature’s move with the partition Fj, · · · , Fu+1, {Fs}s=u,··· ,j−1 and the prob-
abilities as depicted in Fig. 5 which means that agent li ∈ Su (u < j) accepts
the mechanism. It corresponds to the second array (YES) in Fig. 5.
We also assume that the game is of perfect information meaning that all moves
are publicly observed. Finally our construction guarantees that G{l1,··· ,lm}Fj ,S (α) are PG
with SO&PI. Note that the nature’s moves are independent drawn according to the
set of nonstrategic agents are independently from their actions: only the timing of
the draws dependent of those actions.
We show by induction that the unique equilibrium strategy profile in G{l1,··· ,lm}Fj∪S (α)
is such that:
1. If S = ∅, the strategy of the agents i ∈ N \ S is ‘NO’.
2. If S 6= ∅, the strategy of agent i ∈ Su is ‘NO’ if u < j and ‘YES’ for at least
one agent in {l1, · · · , lm} ∩ Sj.
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Such a strategy profile leads to the following final set of participants: if S = ∅,
Fu with probability α
u−1(1−α)




1−αj and Fu with probability
αu−1(1−α)
1−αj for u = 1, · · · , j − 2.
The induction is on m. If m = 0, the induction hypothesis is satisfied. Consider
first the case where S = ∅. Consider li such that li ∈ Su, u < j. If li deviates from
his equilibrium profile by choosing ‘No’ it has an impact on the final outcome only
in the events where nature choose Fs for s = u, · · · , j. In the other events, the final
outcome would be Fs for s = 1, · · · , u − 1 independently of his action. Moreover,
for s = u which occurs with probability α
u−1(1−α)
1−αj , the final outcome will be then
Fu−1 instead of Fu which costs at least  for li as our construction for Sj guarantees.





gain for li is bounded by H. We conclude that the deviation is not profitable since∑j
s=u+1 α
s−1H+αu−1 < 0 as it can be easily checked from our choice for α. For the
case where li ∈ Sj the argument is the same: the difference is only that the potential
gains with the term in H is not absent.
Consider now the case S 6= ∅. For li such that li ∈ Su with u < j the argument
is exactly the same as above. For li ∈ Sj, we now work conditional of the cases
where the final set of nonstrategic agents is Fk with k = j − 1, j. Suppose now
that there are some histories where all the li, i = 1, · · · ,m such that li ∈ Sj do not
participate and where the final set of participants is then Fj∪S, while the remaining
histories are necessarily ending with the set of participants Fj−1 from our induction
hypothesis. and consider the agent li in Su that prefers strictly the Fj−1 outcome to
the Fj ∪ S. Such an agent exists from the way we construct the set Su. This agents
should strictly benefit from choosing the ‘YES’ action which raises a contraction and
thus guarantees that one agent in li, i = 1, · · · ,m such that li ∈ Sj will participate.
Finally, with probability αk−1 the set of nonstrategic agent is ∅ (and thus on a
positive measure on nature’s moves), the final set of participants in any equilibrium
of the game G{1,··· ,n}Fk,∅ (α) is then ∅ and thus the final revenue is necessarily lower than
R∗Partial which raises a contradiction.
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Supplementary Material to “Mechanism Design
with Partially-Specified Participation Games”
Laurent Lamy∗
1 Example 1
We provide a simple example that gives the intuition why Theorem 3 would not
hold if we use the notion of p-subgame perfection according to Kalai and Neme [1]’s
terminology when Property 5. (see subsection 7) is added to the definition of PGs.
We consider that all the agents are symmetric: their final payoffs depend on the total
number of participants and on their participation decisions according to Table A. E.g.
an agent that is the only participant obtains 4 while an agent that participates with
a single other participant obtains 0. The mechanism is 2-strong Nash implementable
but not 3-strong Nash implementable: the full participation outcome is Pareto-
dominated by the full non-participation outcome. On the contrary, given the consent
of at least one agent, the full participation outcome is Pareto-dominant among all
possible outcome among the remaining potential participants.
Consider the following strategy for a given agent: at each node chose an adap-
tation of the participation strategy except in the (out of equilibrium) case where
it is common knowledge that two agents have initially deviated from their equilib-
rium strategies and are not committed to be participating while the third agent has
accepted the mechanism. In such a case, the two remaining agents are playing an
adaptation of the non-participation strategy. The strategy profile where all agents
are using the strategy profile defined above is a 2-subgame perfect equilibrium for
any PG with property 5. Note that in such a strategy profile agents are following
strategies that depend only on public information and thus we can invoke the weak
∗PSE, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris. e-mail: lamy@pse.ens.fr
1
Number of 0 1 2 3
Participants
Participant - 4 0 2
Non-Participant 3 1 1 -
Table A
version of the ‘one-shot deviation principle’ argued in the proof of Theorem 3 to
check the equilibrium property. The only kind of histories where the equilibrium
strategies are not best-response are the ones where two agents initially deviate while
the third one accept the mechanism and one of the two remaining participant accepts
the mechanism which corresponds to a third deviation.
2 The p-strong Nash optimal design program
Denote by B the set of reflexive binary relations over N . For a given element
B ∈ B, let SBi = {j|iBj, j 6= i}. SBi should be viewed as the set of agents threatening
agent i according to the relation B. A specific class of relations are total order
which have been previously characterized by a permutation σ. The binary relation
corresponding to the order σ is such that: jBi if and only if σ−1(j) ≥ σ−1(i). Next
proposition gives a mild characterization of p-strong Nash optimal mechanisms: the
final allocation is efficient while the surplus extracted from each agent equals his
payoff under the final allocation minus his payoff under some harsher feasible threat
according to some set of opponents.
Proposition Any p-strong Nash optimal mechanism (a, t) is such that:
• a(N) corresponds to an efficient allocation
















As a corollary, we obtain that both corollaries 4.1 and 4.2 still hold under partial
subgame-perfect implementation criteria.










subject to maxi∈N\S {V a(N)i − ti(N)− V a(S)i } ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ N with ](N \S) ≤
p+ 1, where (a, t) is a feasible mechanism.
Consider (a, t) a p-strong Nash optimal mechanism. Suppose first that a(N) is
not an efficient allocation. Let (a′, t′) be the mechanism defined in the following way:
• a′(N) is an efficient allocation
• t′i(N) = ti(N) + V a
′(N)
i − V a(N)i , for any i ∈ N
• a′(N) = a(N) and t′(N) = t(N) for any S ( N .
(a′, t′) is feasible since (a, t) is feasible. (a′, t′) satisfies the p-strong Nash con-
straint since (a, t) does and since V a
′(N)




i − ti(N)−V a(S)i . The
revenue raised under (a′, t′) is strictly bigger that the revenue raised under (a, t)
since the welfare is strictly bigger while agents’ surplus are unchanged. We have
thus raised a contradiction with regards to the optimality of (a, t) in the class of
p-strong Nash implementable mechanisms.
Suppose that there exists i ∈ N such that ti(N) 6= V a(N)i − V ∗i (S) for any S ⊂
N \ {i}. Then let (a′′, t′′) be the mechanism exactly identical to (a, t) except that
t′′i (N) = t
′′
i (N) + . For  > 0 sufficiently small then (a′′, t′′) is p-strong Nash
implementable mechanism and raises a revenue that is strictly bigger than (a, t)
which raises a contradiction. CQFD
The characterization in the above proposition is quite coarse and illustrates how
the characterization in proposition 4.4 reduces the complexity of the maximization
program: the maximization moves from the set of reflexive binary relations over N
to the set of total orders. In the special case where all agents are symmetric, any
order leads to the same revenue making the maximization in proposition 4.4 to be
vacuous. On the contrary, the maximization over reflexive binary relations is not
immediate even in this simple case.
One could conjecture that the set of reflexive binary relations to characterize an
optimal mechanism could be significantly shrunk by combining the structure of the
threats of propositions 3.1 and 4.4, e.g. shrunk to the set of total preoders. The
following example illustrates that it can be even worse: the transitivity of the binary
relation B ∈ B in the proposition is not guaranteed.
ConsiderN = 3 and a mechanism (a, t) such that Ui(S) = 0 if i ∈ S, Ui(N\{i}) =
−m and Ui({j}) = −m− for any i ∈ N , where Ui(S) = V a(S)i −ti(S). Suppose that
3
m >  > 0. It can be checked that optimal 2-strong Nash implementable mechanisms
are such that the reflexive binary relation B in the above proposition is a cycle and
thus violates the transitivity property: SBi = {j}, SBj = {k} and SBk = {i} for i, j, k
distinct elements in N . The corresponding optimal revenue equals 3m which lies
strictly between 3(m+) the revenue under 1-strong Nash implementable mechanism
and 2m+  the revenue under 3-strong Nash implementable mechanisms.
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